Indus River Basin Treaty – 1960

Chapter I

Section-I (1947-1951) 

Indus Basin 

The Indus Basin is one of the largest and most economically significant river systems in the world. The main Indus River stretches approximately 1,800 miles, while the full system including its major tributaries extends to about 2,800 miles. The basin drains roughly 450,000 square miles, an area larger than France, and carries an estimated 170 million acre-feet (MAF) of water annually. 87% of basin territory is divided between Pakistan and India, and the rest 13% is spread between Chinese Tibet and Afghanistan. By 1947, nearly 46 million people depended on its waters, with agriculture forming the backbone of the regional economy. This establishes the Indus as not merely a river, but a center of human civilizational emerged some 5000 years ago along the banks of the Indus River and its tributaries and raised majestic city of Mohenjo-Daro in Sindh and Harrapa in Punjab. 

Physical Geography 

The Indus Basin is surrounded by the towering Himalayan, Karakoram and Hindukush ranges, which stretches to Tibetan Highland and achieve an elevation ranging from 2,000–26,000 feet. The mountains shape hydrology by acting as climatic barriers and natural reservoirs. South of the mountains lies a sub montane plateau around 2,000 feet, followed by the vast Punjab and Sind plains, mostly below 1,000 feet elevation. The gentle south-westward slope of the plains makes them uniquely suitable for large scale canal irrigation systems. 

Climate and Water Regime 

The basin’s hydrology is governed by two primary seasons: winter (December–February) and summer monsoon (June–September). Climatically, the region divides into the Himalayan Zone, Sub-Himalayan Zone, and Plains. The Himalayas receive heavy precipitation, sometimes exceeding 50 inches annually primarily as snow, while rainfall in the plains declines south-westward to less than 20 inches, and in Sind often below 5 inches. Crucially, the Indus system depends heavily on snow, accumulates during the winter and then high summer temperature generates enough energy to gear up flow of water in river channels that continues incessantly for about three months (July-September) and often brims out of banks and brings heavy floods in the upper and lower Indus plains. 

Indus River System 

The Indus system consists of the main Indus River and six principal tributaries: the Kabul, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. The Indus rises near Lake Manasarovar (about 14,000 feet elevation) in Tibetan plateau close to Mount Kailash (22,000 feet), flowing roughly 2,000 miles before entering the Arabian Sea. The western tributaries Kabul, Jhelum, and Chenab carry the bulk of the water derived both from snowmelt and rainfall, while the eastern rivers Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej are more rainfall dependent. These rivers progressively merge, with the Chenab acting as a major collector before the waters ultimately join the Indus near Punjnad in southern Punjab and then onward flows in single stream unto the formation of its deltaic fan stretched along the Arabia Sea in Sind. 

Seasonal Flow Patterns 

Although perennial, the rivers display strong seasonal variation. Flow is lowest between mid-December and mid-February, rises sharply during spring snowmelt, and peaks during July–August due to combined effect of snowmelt and monsoon rainfall. Of the total annual supply of 170 MAF, the western rivers contribute 137 MAF including approximately 23 MAF from the Jhelum, 26 MAF from the Chenab, and the remainder 88 MAF largely comes from the Indus main stem. The eastern rivers contribute 33 MAF water including 6 MAF (Ravi), 13 MAF (Beas), and 14 MAF (Sutlej). As these rivers descend into the plains, their hydrological characteristics are further shaped by physical and human geographical factors. Flowing across long alluvial tracts with gentle gradients, the rivers experience significant evaporation, seepage, and floodplain storage, often referred to as valley storage. Downstream discharge may differ considerably from upstream measurements due to these natural losses. The rivers have high capacity of sediment suspensions during flood periods, contributing to shifting channels and the formation of fertile plains. Annual flows vary substantially from year to year despite consistent seasonal patterns, making water storage and regulation essential for irrigation planning. 

Water Balance 

Significant water losses occur as rivers traverse long plains evaporation, seepage, and percolation are substantial over stretches such as the 1,000-mile Indus and the 500-mile Sutlej. Floodwaters are temporarily stored in riverbanks and adjacent lands, a process referred to as “valley storage.” 

Groundwater Hydrology 

Groundwater in the Indus Basin historically existed as a shallow and locally accessible resource, particularly in the floodplains of the Punjab and Sind regions. 

Before the development of large-scale canal irrigation, communities relied on traditional lifting devices mostly used animal power to extract subsoil water with the help of Persian wheels for limited agricultural use. The natural water table in many areas was relatively near the surface, making such methods feasible. At this stage, groundwater functioned primarily as a supplementary irrigation source rather than the main agricultural supply, as surface river flows remained the dominant water resource. The introduction and expansion of extensive canal irrigation systems fundamentally altered water balance in the basin. Continued seepage from unlined canals and percolation from irrigated fields caused a substantial rise in groundwater levels across large tracts of the plains. In certain canal command areas, the water table rose by approximately 10 feet, while in the Upper Bari Doab Canal region it had risen by 30–35 feet by 1944, and in some areas by as much as 47 feet since 1905. This dramatic rise reflected the cumulative impact of continuous surface irrigation over decades. While canal systems increased agricultural productivity, they simultaneously transformed the basin’s subsurface hydrology. 

The unintended consequence of this groundwater rise was widespread waterlogging and salinity, particularly in poorly drained and low-lying areas of the plains. High evaporation rates in the arid climate caused salts to accumulate near the soil surface, reducing crop yields and threatening long-term agricultural sustainability. To counteract this problem, large-scale groundwater pumping through tubewells became necessary to lower the water table and restore soil productivity. Thus, groundwater management emerged as an essential complement for water management in Indus Basin, illustrating that the Indus Basin’s hydrology is an interconnected system in which river flows, canal networks, and subsurface water dynamics must be managed together. 

Evolution of Irrigation Development in Punjab 

The evolution of irrigation development in Punjab up to 1947 represents one of the most remarkable hydraulic transformations of the modern world. Unlike lower riparian regions, Punjab’s irrigation history under British administration moved rapidly from rudimentary inundation systems to highly engineered perennial canal networks and ultimately to inter-basin hydraulic integration. This transformation unfolded gradually in stages and reflected both technological innovation and imperial economic strategy. 

Before the mid-nineteenth century, irrigation in Punjab relied primarily on seasonal inundation canals drawn from the Ravi, Sutlej, Chenab, and Jhelum rivers. These systems operated only during flood seasons and were dependent upon natural river rises. Their discharge was uncertain, and their command areas were limited to low-lying tracts adjacent to riverbanks. The absence of headworks or permanent diversion structures meant that cultivation patterns were unstable and largely dependent on climatic variability. 

The decisive transformation began with the construction of the Upper Bari Doab Canal (UBDC) in 1859 and formally introduced state directed hydraulic planning. Drawn from the Ravi, UBDC irrigated approximately one million acres and marked the first large scale perennial canal in Punjab. This canal introduced the year round regulated supply and established the model for future canal construction in the Basin. Second project was Sirhind Canal, completed in 1872, off-took from the Sutlej. By 1880, roughly 3 million acres in Punjab had come under irrigation, reflecting the shift from seasonal flood irrigation to controlled perennial engineering. 

Development of Canal Colonies (1890-1910) 

The most dramatic expansion occurred during the construction of canal colonies started between 1890 and 1910. The Lower Chenab Canal, opened in 1892, irrigated approximately 2.45 million acres, of which about 1.81 million acres were previously barren Crown waste lands. This project not only expanded cultivation but also initiated large scale agrarian colonization. Settlers were brought into newly irrigated tracts, transforming arid desert zones into productive agricultural regions. Financial returns were exceptionally high; the Lower Chenab Canal yielded approximately 45 percent annual returns, and net revenues were estimated between 1–2 million pounds annually. The Lower Jhelum Canal, opened in 1901, extended irrigation further into the interfluvial tracts. These projects converted central Punjab into one of the most intensively cultivated agricultural regions of British India. By 1915, Punjab’s irrigation engineering had matured into basin level integration through the Triple Canal Project (TCP). The TCP was an inter-basin transfer of water from surplus to deficit zones reflecting a sophisticated understanding of basin hydrology. This scheme linked the Upper Jhelum Canal, by transferring water from the Jhelum to the Chenab, and the Upper Chenab Canal, transferring water from the Chenab to the Ravi, while remodeling the Lower Bari Doab Canal. TCP represented a transition from isolated canal works to coordinated hydraulic management across multiple rivers. The integration maximized utilization of snowmelt flows and stabilized irrigation supplies across different Doabs. 

By 1947, Punjab formed the core of an irrigation system covering approximately 26 million acres across the Indus Basin. Cropping intensity in major perennial canal systems such as the Upper Bari Doab and Lower Chenab approached 100 percent. Additionally, around 4.73 million acres were irrigated by wells, particularly in Punjab plains, supplementing canal supplies and stabilizing rabi cultivation. However, extensive canal seepage and flat topography led to rising groundwater tables, and in some areas the water table rose to within approximately 10 feet of the surface, generating waterlogging and salinity problems. Despite these environmental stresses, Punjab by 1947 possessed the most extensive and technically advanced perennial irrigation system in the world, characterized by large command areas, inter basin transfers, and high agricultural productivity. 

Evolution of Irrigation Development in Sindh 

The evolution of irrigation in Sindh followed a distinctly different trajectory from that of Punjab. Whereas Punjab’s development was characterized by early adoption of perennial canals and inter-basin integration, Sindh remained heavily dependent on inundation systems for a much longer period. Its irrigation transformation was concentrated primarily in the early twentieth century and centered on river regulation rather than inter-river transfer. Sindh relied almost entirely on inundation canals drawn directly from the Indus River. These canals operated during the annual flood season and irrigated lands adjacent to the river. Because they depended on natural flood levels, discharge varied widely from year to year, and cultivated areas fluctuated accordingly. The system lacked permanent control structures, and irrigation was limited to kharif cultivation in many areas. Agricultural productivity was therefore highly sensitive to variations in Indus flows, and drought years significantly reduced cultivated acreage. 

The fundamental transformation of Sindh irrigation occurred with the construction of the Sukkur Barrage. The barrage represented one of the largest hydraulic works in the Indus Basin prior to Partition. Seven major canals were constructed coming from barrage, collectively commanding approximately 6.617 million acres. The Sukkur Barrage, originally named the Lloyd Barrage, conceived in 1910s, construction started in 1923 and completed in 1932. The project was designed to regulate the Indus River’s flow and convert flood-based irrigation into controlled, perennial supply. The barrage is 1.6 kilometers long with multiple gated spans to regulate discharge. The barrage ensured previously seasonal inundation irrigation into regulated perennial irrigation, established controlled diversion of Indus waters, stabilized agricultural supply, and dramatically expanded cultivation in lower Sindh. Approximately 2.17 million acres were irrigated in Sind through flood-based systems, and well irrigation was less extensive due to higher salinity in groundwater. 

Over time, the expansion of canal irrigation in Sindh also contributed to rising groundwater levels and salinity, particularly because of flat terrain and inadequate drainage. Waterlogging began to emerge as a structural problem, though large-scale drainage solutions were not implemented before 1947. By 1947, Sindh’s irrigation system had transitioned from traditional inundation dependence to a regulated barrage centered system covering over 6 million acres. However, unlike Punjab, it lacked inter-river transfer mechanisms and remained dependent on upstream flow regimes. Its hydraulic security was therefore structurally tied to developments in upper riparian regions. While the Sukkur Barrage represented a monumental engineering achievement, Sindh’s irrigation model remained more vulnerable to political and hydrological changes upstream. 

Punjab-Sind Water Dispute 

Sindh’s transformation centered on regulating a single river system more efficiently. Since Sindh lies in the lower riparian zone, its irrigation remained highly sensitive to upstream withdrawals in Punjab. During the 1930s and 1940s, Sindh raised objections to increased withdrawals and new canal constructions in Punjab, arguing that such projects could reduce Indus flows reaching the barrage. These disputes culminated in investigations by the Anderson Committee in 1935 and then in 1941 by the B.N. Rau Commission. Although some adjustments were discussed, no definitive settlement was achieved till the partition of India in 1947. 

Partition of India 

On June 3, 1947, the Government of Britain announced the partition plan of India to be implemented by June 1948. On 18 July, 1947, the British House of Commons adopted “Indian 

Independence Act-1947” and promulgated in the midnight of 14 & 15 August, 1947 and transferred the powers to two successor dominions of India and Pakistan1. Viceroy Lord Mountbatten (1900-1979), to execute the partition of India, established “Partition Committees” responsible for dividing administrative structures, including bureaucracies, police forces, army, treasury, public assets such as irrigation systems, railways, educational institutions, and government offices. Under section 3 & 4 of the Indian Independence Act-1947, delineated the division of erstwhile Bengal and Punjab provinces between India and Pakistan.2 

1 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1947/30/pdfs/ukpga_19470030_en.pdf 

2 ibid 

3 M.M.Sadhullah. (1983). Note on the “Radcliffe Award.” The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents (Vol. 1, p. XL). Lahore: National Documentation Centre. 

4Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Emergence of Pakistan (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1967). 

5 Ibid. 

6 M.M.Sadhullah. (1983). Note on the “Radcliffe Award.” The Partition of the Punjab 1947: A Compilation of Official Documents (Vol. 1, p. XL). Lahore: National Documentation Centre. 

The Partition Committees of Punjab and Bengal were equally represented by Hindu community nominated by Indian National Congress (INC), founded in 1885, Bombay, and Muslim community nominated by All-India Muslim League (AIML), founded in 1906, Dhaka. In case of the division of Punjab, Congress Party agreed to include one Sikh representative from Sharomani Akali Dal (SAD), founded in 1920, Amritsar, for Punjab Boundary Commission. Muslim League proposed inclusion of independent chairmen for each Boundary Commission, may be hired from the United Nations (UN) or as proposed by Mountbatten to invite International Court of Justice (ICJ) for selection of the chairmen of two boundary commissions, however, both INC and AIML could not reach consensus on the selection criterion of the Chairmen of Boundary Commissions. Finally, the Viceroy, in agreement with INC and AIML, appointed Sir Cyril Radcliffe (1899-1977), a British lawyer from the United Kingdom to demarcate the boundaries between Punjab and Bengal.3 

All India Muslim League, was not in favor of partition of Bengal and Punjab, rather wanted full inclusion of the two provinces in Pakistan as endorsed in historic “Lahore Resolution” passed on 23rd March, 1940. The Muslim population in Punjab was 57 percent and in Bengal 55 percent, respectively4. The East and West Punjab Assemblies met on 23 June, 1947 and voted on the question of partition of Punjab. The Parliament of West Punjab, with steadfast resolve, declared its opposition through a formal resolution, whilst the Parliament of East Punjab, in a manner wholly at variance, proclaimed its approbation of the partition of Punjab. Statistically, the West Punjab Assembly voted against partition of the province by 99 votes to 27. However, the East Punjab Assembly decided in favor of partition of the province by 50 votes to 225. The respective results showed profound and irreconcilable divergence between the two administrative parts of the same province. However, the British government wanted to safeguard the imperial interests with the least possible damage to their prestige.6 

In 1947, the population of undivided India was 390 million, of which approximately 60 million—30 million each—resided in what became West Pakistan and East Pakistan. The partition of India 

made 16.6 percent erstwhile India population to the citizens of Pakistan. The demarcation of two boundaries pushed approximately 14.5 million people to cross the borders and one million killed during the passage of pangs of partition. Simultaneously, 562 Indian princely states were allowed to join either India or Pakistan based on the wishes and religious consideration of their people. These states were semi-autonomous regions ruled by local monarchs under the suzerainty of the British Crown. In Punjab, the total number of princely states was 16 out of which Patiala, Jind, Nabha, Kapurthala, Faridkot, Malerkotla, Kalsia joined East Punjab. Whereas, Bahawalpur was the only princely state which acceded to Pakistan and integrated with the province of west Punjab in 1947. 

Partition of Punjab 

Undivided Punjab (Area) 99408 Square Miles 

West Punjab 61980 Square Miles 

East Punjab 37428 Square Miles 

Undivided Area (irrigated) 26 million acres 

West Punjab Area (irrigated) 18 million acres 

East Punjab Area (irrigated) 08 million acres 

Cultivable area (West Punjab) 19 million acres 

Cultivable area (East Punjab) 14 million acres 

West Punjab (Population) 15.8 million 

East Punjab (Population) 12.6 million 

Radcliffe Award, Territoriality and Water Anxiety 

Sir Cyril Radcliffe appointed by Lord Mountbatten, served as the chairman of two Boundary Commissions tasked with dividing Punjab and Bengal and demarcating international boundary between India and Pakistan. Radcliffe with no prior experience in India, arrived in Delhi on July 8, 1947. In the past, the Britain have had the experience of demarcating international border, through diplomatic engagement, between British India and Afghanistan. Henry Mortimer Durand (1850-1924), Foreign Secretary of British India and the Amir of Afghanistan, Abdur Rahman (1840–1901), signed an agreement on 12 November, 1893 and drew 2640-kilometer-long Indo-Afghan boundary known as “Durand Line,” in fact, finalized in a span of two years — 18957. 

7 Syed, A. H. (1976). Pakistan: A geopolitical analysis (1947–1974) (Doctoral dissertation). School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. 

The term of references for division of Punjab and Bengal as enunciated in Indian Independence Act-1947 was “geographical contiguity” areas of Muslims and non-Muslim population, and “other factors” to ascertain and demarcate the international boundary between India and Pakistan. The Boundary Commission used the demographic results of Indian Census held in 1941 to 

determine contiguity majority areas of Muslim or non-Muslim. However, the Commission did not exactly define in its terms of reference the land “unit” to be used to determine the contiguity of Muslim and non-Muslim territories in the two provinces. Sir Zafarullah Khan (1893-1985), representing All India Muslim League before the Commission, confirmed that partially “tehsil’ had been used as territorial “unit” to determine the limit of contiguity areas in the final arguments before the Boundary Commission8. 

8 Wilcox, W., & Embree, A. T. (2004). The reminiscences of Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan (Introduction by P. Perwazi). Fazil-i-Umar Press,USA. 

9 Record of the meeting of the Partition Committee, Jullundur, 18-19 November, 1947 

10 Emergence of Pakistan by Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, 1967 

The British-Indian government established a Punjab Partition Committee (PPC) and Arbitral Tribunal to divide and manage the assets of Punjab between India and Pakistan. The Punjab Partition Committee (PPC), was composed of the Governor of Punjab as chairman with two members; Sardar Sawarn Singh from East Punjab and Sardar Shaukat Hayat from West Punjab. In case of any difference in the decision of the PPC, the matter can be referred to the Arbitral Tribunal. the Arbitral Tribunal was headed by Sir Patrick Spence (1885–1973), former Chief Justice of India, Sir Harilal Jekisundas Kania (1890 –1951) on behalf of India, who became first Chief Justice of India in 1947 and Justice S Ismail to represent Pakistan. An expert “Committee-B” was constituted to address the matters pertaining to the division of joint assets including “canal water”. 

On 28 July, 1947 Punjab Partition Committee, considered the Report of Expert of “Committee-B” enunciated at paragraph-15 that: “the committee agreed that there is no question of varying the authorized shares of water to which the two zones and various canals are entitled”. The PPC appointed Sarup Singh, Chief Engineer, Irrigation, East Punjab and M.A. Hamid, Chief Engineer, Irrigation, West Punjab to to put up a “joint proposal” for maintenance of supplies of water from UBDC and Ferozepore Headworks.9 

At this point, Chaudhry Muhammad Ali asserted that the issue of canal water sharing had satisfactorily been decided by “Committee-B”, therefore “no question of varying the authorized shares of water to which the two zones and the various canals authorized.” Further the Committee-B agreed to maintain pre-partition shares of water in respective canals and had not referred the issue to the Arbitral Tribunal and the questions of “valuation” of “canal system” and “wasteland” remained unconcluded.10 

The Punjab Boundary Commission was constituted of equal numbers of Muslim and non-Muslim jurists, included, Justice Din Muhammad (1897–1961), Justice Muhammad Munir (1895-1979): representing the Muslim League and Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan (1889-1967), Justice Teja Singh (1898-1965): representing the Indian National Congress. Despite a broader mandate, the members were looking after the interests on party lines, therefore, the final words rested with the British Chairman to announce the boundary verdict. Justice Munir, a Muslim member of the commission, recorded his resentment on the overt biases and covert support shown by Mountbatten and Radcliffe to safeguard the interests of India. In the wake of flagrant disposition of British 

authorities towards India, Munir offered his resignation to Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), which he turned down. 

Chaudhry Muhammad Ali (1905-1982) who represented All India Muslim League in the Partition Committee, on 10 August 1947, informally discussed shameful violation of the principles of partition by Radcliffe with chief of staff of viceroy of India, General Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay(1887-1965), without having any formal response11. Even Jinnah was greatly upset by the abominable award and interpreted it as incomprehensible and even perverse, he decided to live up to the commitment and to abide by the decision and asserted that we must bear this blow ‘with fortitude, courage and hope12.’ 

11 Bashir A. Malik (2005), Indus water Treaty in Retrospect 

12 Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal. The Politics of the Punjab Boundary Award. Working Paper No. 1, South Asia Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Heidelberg, September 2000. 

13 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. xxvi. 

14 Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal. The Politics of the Punjab Boundary Award. Working Paper No. 1, South Asia Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Heidelberg, September 2000. 

15 ibid 

16 Implementing Partition: Proceedings of the Punjab Partition Committee, July–August, 1947, Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 February 2021,YAQOOB KHAN BANGASH 

The British ruled India for more than two and half centuries, and Mountbatten decided to leave the jewel of the British crown within seventy-three days seemed somehow a hasty decision. Radcliffe disbursed his award and divided the most historically important and highly populous provinces of Punjab and Bengal. He delayed the announcement of the boundary award till 18 August,13 allegedly gaining time to make certain adjustments and compromises in favor of the preferred party(ies).14 In the result of the Radcliffe Award, Pakistan was left with a highly insecure and exposed border with India. The token of religion was used as the main criterion to dismember villages, farms, and homes, and infrastructure and sowed deep-seated hatred among the Punjabis. The vibrant culture of Punjab, shaped over centuries of cultural, religious, and social cohesion, evaporated within days, kneaded one million dead bodies along the soil of the new border. The partition of Punjab left approximately ten million people homeless, on both sides of the border. 

Radcliffe Award allotted, unjustly, the Muslim majority areas to India and not a single Hindu majority area was awarded to Pakistan. The rule of “other factors,” was mostly used biasedly to benefit India rather than Pakistan. In Punjab, Muslim majority tehsils including Ajnala, Jullaudhar, Nakodara, Zera and Ferozpur were awarded to India.15 Along the territorial border of the state of Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab, Muslim majority tehsils of Gurdaspur, Batala, and Pathankot in Gurdaspur district were also allotted to India. The decision was seen as openly “biased” against the Muslim interests and pre-planned attempt to facilitate India to provide contiguous land route with Jammu and Kashmir.16 

“The Commission deviated from their duty to fairly and impartially draw the boundary between India and Pakistan a day or so before the announcement of the official land award because of one 

reason: water”17. Further, political maneuvering, personal connections, technical and strategic interests of “bigger” India successfully acquired the control of land and water of newly born Pakistan18. The Muslim member(s) of the Punjab Boundary Commission unequivocally expressed their dissatisfaction with proceedings of the commission and tendered resignation to Jinnah, though it was declined. The Muslim member(s) also alluded Jinnah that Radcliffe had already predetermined the boundary line, which they believed was heavily biased against interests of Muslims of Pakistan. 

17 Sattar, U. (2019, March 27). Hydropolitics in the Indus Basin: The Indus Water Treaty & water mismanagement in Pakistan. The Yale Review of International Studies. Retrieved December 8, 2024, from https://yris.yira.org 

18 Bashir A. Malik (2005), Indus water Treaty in Retrospect 

19 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. xxvi. 

20 Emergence of Pakistan by Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, 1967 

Politically, no faction in nascent Pakistan was able to mount a meaningful protest in political terms, nor did any dare to openly reject the “moth-eaten” formation of Pakistan. The leadership of Pakistan subserviently remained silent and accepted a truncated Pakistan as fait accompli carved out by the hands of Radcliffe or Mountbatten. Ayesha Jalal argued that the demand for the partition of India was a colossal miscalculation. The prevailing conditions compelled Jinnah to acquiesce in the creation of the very ‘maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten’ nation which he had rejected in 1944 and again in 194619. 

The Radcliffe Award severed almost all essential infrastructure with particular damage to irrigation infrastructure built during the last eight decades by the British Raj in the Indus Basin. Indus River and its five tributaries were cut in a fashion to bifurcate Punjab in to East and West Punjab. Before partition, 37 million acres of arable land used to receive canal water for irrigation. The partition, transferred 31 million acres to Pakistan and 6 million to India20. In the pre-partition era, neither India nor Pakistan had any storage dam facility to regulate the flow of canals for irrigating arable lands. 

Radcliffe award undermined the socio-economic interest of West Punjab. Two of the most important and crucial river headworks of Madhopur, on Ravi River, and Ferozepur on Sutlej River were awarded to East Punjab, India. Whereas, the lands and canals of “Bari Doab” to be irrigated by these waters were situated in the West Punjab. India, in an effort to garner international support for its actions, often emphasized that it received only three out of the sixteen pre-partition canals. This argument underscored the intention to expand and develop water infrastructure, not only to plan the immediate needs of post-partition period but also to boost future economic activities through enhanced agricultural production and electricity generation within India. 

On 20 December, 1947 the two provincial governments of East and West Punjab signed the following standstill agreements to continue flow of water from UBDC and Ferozepure headworks, 

i. “Stand-still Agreement regarding the running of the Upper Bari Doab Canal between the Governments of East and West Punjab. Jullundur.” 

ii. “Stand-still Agreement regarding the running of the Sutlej Valley Canals between the Governments of the East and West Punjab. Simla.” 

According to the two Standstill Agreements, the parties explicitly enumerated that: 

i. Validity of the agreements would be up to the end of Rabi Crop i.e. 31 March 1948. 

ii. Two parties, subsequent upon expiry, may further extend agreement for any specific period. 

iii. Status quo would be maintained as in vogue prior to the partition of Punjab. 

iv. Distribution program would be the responsibility of the two Irrigation Departments. 

v. Telegraph lines running from Amritsar to Wagha shall immediately be restored. 

vi. No restitution of unused water would be available. 

vii. West Punjab will pay share of all expenditures to East Punjab from 15.8.47 to 31.03.48 

viii. Arbitral Tribunal would determine the valuation and division of canal assets. 

State of Bikaner 

Adjoining princely state of Bikaner was anxious about the division of canal water between East and West Punjab. Water supplies to Bikaner were solely dependent upon 120-kilometer-long Bikaner (Gang) Canal, perennial in nature, commissioned in 1927. Originating from the Ferozepur Barrage, the canal traversed primarily through Punjab before reaching the arid lands of Bikaner and Rajputana. It irrigated 0.6 million acres of barren terrain while also providing drinking water to the people and the state of Bikaner. In the pre-partition period, Bikaner used to pay seigniorage charges (Rupee 2.1 crores) for the maintenance of Bikaner canal and Ferozpur headworks to Punjab. 

Uncertainty that revolved around the fate of Ferozepure and Zera Tehsils in Ferozepure district, pushed Maharaja of Bikaner, Lieutenant General Sadul Singh (1902-1950) to use his personal influence on the Viceroy, with whom he had served as compatriot and fought in the same trench in the World War-I. Maharaj approached Mountbatten through a representation by his state Prime Minister Kavalam Madhava Panikkar (1895–1963) and Chief Engineer, Dr. Rai Bahadur Kanwar Sain Gupta (1899–1979) and appealed to keep Ferozpur barrage in India, otherwise, he would be forced to join Pakistan. The tactical diplomacy of Maharaja proved effective and Radcliffe, under the influence of the Viceroy, handed over three Muslim majority tehsils of Ferozepure, Fazilka and Zira to India, thus ensured water provision to the state of Bikaner from Ferozepur barrage21. Earlier, during the official proceedings of the Commission, Radcliffe had assured Justice Munir the inclusion of Ferozpure, Fazilka and Zira tehsils to Pakistan.22 

21 Dr. Sain, Kanwar. Reminiscences of an Engineer. Young Asia Publications, 1978. 

22 

State of Bahawalpur 

State of Bahawalpur acceded to Pakistan on 7 October 1947, under Nawab Sadiq Muhammad Khan Abbasi-V. Bahawalpur was a riparian princely state bordered with Rajasthan, Sutlej and Indus Rivers, significantly benefited from the canal irrigation system in Punjab, which irrigated approximately 2.72 million acres (1945-46) of its territory. The Eastern Gray and Dipalpur canal, 

both inundation canals, provided water to 17000- 48000 acres of land of Bahawalpur state from Ferozepur Headworks. 

Bahawalpur was not paying any seigniorage charges to Punjab for the maintenance of the Ferozepur headworks, as it was not considered a partner of the headworks. The state irrigated its lands primarily through “inundation” canals, which received water only during the summer (kharif) or monsoon season. Additionally, the Fordwah and Eastern Siddiqua canals, drawing water from the Suleimanki Barrage, also contributed to its irrigation needs. In total, five canals provided water to the Bahawalpur State, mostly originating from the West Punjab irrigation network. Bahawalpur strongly advocated for retaining the critical irrigation infrastructure and the Sutlej Valley Canals, which originated from the Ferozepur, Suleimanki, and Islam Headworks, within the territorial boundaries of West Punjab.23 

23 ibid 

In June 1948, India linked resumption of water supply to Bahawalpur State Distillery (BSD) provided west Punjab stopped digging “Sutlej Cut.” The Indian Prime Minister advised Pakistan to abandon the creation of new outlet from Sutlej to bypass Ferozepure headworks, otherwise, the relations might aggravate. This was a sign of warning to Pakistan, without receiving positive assurance to address its water concerns. The two countries remained engaged for quite a good time but failed to reach acceptable solution for CBDC and DC. Pakistan wanted to maintain status quo in supply of water to West Punjab as permitted in pre-partition period till the time an agreement was reached between the two countries. 

Stoppage of Canal Water 

On 1st April, 1948, within a brief period of eight months from partition, the Radcliffe Boundary Award started soaring bilateral relations between India and Pakistan, when the provincial government of East Punjab, unilaterally, stopped the flow of irrigation water coming from the headworks that fell under its control to West Punjab and laid the foundation of a long-drawn water dispute between two newly independent countries. The East Punjab action reflected inherent flaws in the demarcation of Punjab boundary, as it kept headworks in East Punjab and canals and land to be irrigated in west Punjab. The East Punjab implemented its decision without consulting the central government of India, as irrigation was a provincial subject. The central government of India not only accepted the action of Punjab government but took little remedial measures to address the worries associated with adequate water supply to Pakistan. 

Despite the availability of substantial political, diplomatic, and technical expertise, these resources were squandered in open confrontation, failing to build mutual confidence between the two emerging nations. The lack of collaboration prevented the effective use of bilateral and multilateral tools, resulting in a prolonged stalemate. The impasse carried the risk of escalating military tensions and intensifying competition over water resources, jeopardizing the ability of both states to meet their future food and development needs within the divided Indus Basin. Further, the Indian behavior promoted deep sense of fear and self-defense among the minds of the people and policy makers of Pakistan. 

1st April action by East Punjab government was rooted in the concept of “sovereignty” whereas the position of West Punjab was dwelled into the principle of “historic usage”. Formation of two sovereign states, encouraged the province of East Punjab, to stem the flow of water being upper riparian, without considering the actual needs of lower riparian state.24 The cessation of water flow from East Punjab, directly affected 10% (1.5 million acres) of cultivated land in perennial “Bari Doab” canal command area in the districts of Lahore and Sheikhupura. The part of Sutlej valley situated in Pakistan was the second most affected region by the Indian decision. In total, approximately, 6% of the entire irrigated area, at the time of Kharif sowing season, was affected by the decision of East Punjab in Pakistan.25 

24 Bashir A. Malik(2005), Indus water Treaty in Retrospect 

25 Gulhati, N. D. (1973). Indus Waters Treaty: An exercise in international mediation. Allied Publishers. 

26 ibid 

27 India-Pakistan Relations 1947-2007 MEF India.pdf 

Whereas, Government of East Punjab confirmed that under the Punjab Partition (Apportionment of Assets and Liabilities) Order, 1947, and the Arbitral Award, the proprietary rights in the waters of the rivers in East Punjab vest wholly in the East Punjab Government and that West Punjab Government cannot claim any share of these waters as a right. According to the minutes of Inter-Dominion Conference, West Punjab government accepted the agreement and expressed reservations only about the right to levy seigniorage charges for water and capital cost of Madhopur Headworks and associated channels26. 

Pakistan launched a wave of political, diplomatic and administrative engagements with East Punjab and central government of India against the decision of cessation of canal waters to west Punjab. Some signs of initiation administrative understanding and common concerns, Irrigation Secretary of East Punjab on 29 March 1948 reminded his counterpart in West Punjab, through a telegram, to hold the next session of consultations to renew the two-standstill agreement, the Chief Engineer West Punjab, next day, requested through telegraphic message to extend the validity of two agreements and announce a date for next consultations. 

On 1st April, the government of East Punjab, India closed water supply from UBDC and Ferozepure headworks to west Punjab, Pakistan. Mr. E.L. Protheroe, Chief Engineer Irrigation, West Punjab, Pakistan sent an urgent telegraphic message to his counterpart, Sardar Sarup Singh and enquired that “have you stopped supplies to the Central Bari Doab Canal and Sutlej Valley Canals” and also requested him to extend the period of standstill agreements pending the next joint meeting. In response, he regretted the decision of East Punjab to stop water without “good” cause and further stated that the boundary issues fell within the purview of the central government, therefore, the issue may be discussed at “dominion” level27. 

Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan telegrammed Indian Prime Minister Pandit Nehru to intervene and restore water supply in Upper Bari Doab Canal (perennial) and Depalpur Canal (seasonal) originating in East Punjab serve districts in both East and West Punjab. Pakistani Prime Minister stated that the East Punjab government had stopped water supply on 1st April to West 

Punjab through both canals, citing the expiration of a three-month agreement. The Pakistani Prime Minister called the question of renewal of the two standstill agreements as “incidental matter.”28 

28 India-Pakistan Relations 1947-2007 MEF India.pdf 

29 N.D. Gulhati 

30 Telegram No 1519 dated 24.4.48: Liaquat Ali, Khan to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru w.r.t. Telg. No. 1124 dated 16.4.48 

31 Daniel Haines 

32 India-Pakistan Relations 1947-2007 MEF India.pdf 

vi. On 16 April, in the face of strong reaction from Pakistan, the Indian Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) responded in a telegraphic message that “a conference is now scheduled between two Chief Engineers to consider this problem, I trust a satisfactory solution will be reached.” 

vii. On 18 April, the two Chief Engineers of Punjabs met in Simla, and renewed the two expired standstill agreements, which were to take effect from the date of their ratification by the leadership of two Dominions.29 

viii. On 24 April, Prime Minister of Pakistan Liaquat Ali Khan, in a telegraphic message to Indian Prime Minister Nehru, emphasized that West Punjab: 

i. Lands should continue to receive similar amount of irrigation, as stipulated before partition. 

ii. Has inherent and prescriptive rights to obtain water. 

iii. Will hold East Punjab liable for any loss or damage to its people30. 

ix. On 30th April, a day before convening Inter-Dominion Conference (IDC) in Delhi, Prime Minister Nehru, as a goodwill gesture, advised Gopichand Bharghava (1889-1966), Chief Minister of East Punjab, to immediately restore “interim water supply” to west Punjab, as water stoppage was an” inhuman” act. He further stated that cessation of water would have serious consequences both for food production and perception of India internationally.31 The East Punjab government, on instructions of the Indian Prime Minister, restored water supplies to UBDC and Diplapur canal, subject to any variation to be made to two standstill agreements, before participating in Inter-Dominion Conference scheduled to be held from 1-3 May, 1948 in Delhi. 

x. Governor of West Punjab also reiterated the request of restoration of water to west Punjab and specifically mentioned in his letter that West Punjab had agreed to pay 43% of the cost of UBDC and 69% of Ferozepure Headworks for Depalpur canal operations.32The West Punjab government approached the East Punjab government and appealed to continue uninterrupted supply of water, as before partition, as a token of our friendliness, otherwise, food production would be affected and cause great and unnecessary distress. West Punjab also recognized the 

need for an agreement and expressed hope that the leadership of the center and provincial governments would address the matter very soon33. 

33 India-Pakistan Relations 1947-2007 MEF India.pdf 

34 Government from Inside, N.V. Gadgil 

35Emergence of Pakistan 

36 India-Pakistan Relations 1947-2007 MEF India.pdf 

Inter-Dominions Conference, 1-3 May, 1948, Delhi, 

The Delegation for Inter-Dominions Conference held from 1-3 May, 1948 in Delhi, Pakistan, instead of representing by the Prime Minister, headed by Malik Ghulam Muhammad (1895–1956), Finance Minister, accompanied by two senior ministers from west Punjab including Shaukat Hayat Khan (1915-1998) and Mumtaz Daultana(1916-1995) to negotiate the canal water dispute with India. The composition of the Pakistani delegation exhibited a lowering down the representational level for IDC-Delhi. Whereas, Prime Minister Nehru, represented India along with East Punjab Irrigation Minister Sardar Swarn Singh (1907-1994) and Narhar Vishnu Gadgil (1896-1966), Minister for Public Works and Rehabilitation, assisted by Gopalsawami Ayyangar(1882-1953) and Dr Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891-1956). East Punjab, maintained their position and insisted on recognizing their “sovereign rights” as well as acknowledgement of West Punjab that it had “no right” to the waters of three eastern rivers. India categorically refused to release water to west Punjab unless accepted the two narrated conditions. N.V.Gadgil proposed Pakistan to make alternate water supply arrangements as India intended to reduce water flow in future to irrigate its own barren lands. He offered a five-year grace period to Pakistan for making necessary alternate water arrangements.34 

Malik Ghulam Mhummad highlighted the critical issue of riparian rights, stressing that stopping water would harm the economy and food supply of West Punjab. Malik Ghulam Mohammed expressed regret over the uncompromising legal interpretation of Dr. B.R.Ambedkar and insisted on signing a “provisional agreement” without prejudice to legal claims. On deepening of negotiation impasse, Lord Mountbatten, Governor General, on request, intervened after consulting with Jawaharlal Nehru, and India tabled a draft “statement” before the Pakistani delegation, demanding that for the restoration of the flow of water, they have to sign the “draft statement” without changing “a word or comma.”35 

The inflexible Indian position of “sovereign rights” on canal water created serious impediments for Pakistan to continue negotiations to a fruitful end. To address the India position Pakistan offered to refer the matter of sovereign right to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for adjudication. Prime Minister Nehru categorically opposed the Pakistani idea and stated that “To think, ab initio, of a third party will lessen the sense of responsibility of the judges and will also be a confession of our continued dependence on others. This would hardly be becoming of a proud and self-respecting independent nation”36 thus set aside a genuine need of legal interpretation to emotional national pride. 

Whereas, Sardar Vallabhai Patel (1875-1950), in a letter (dated 25 February, 1950) addressed to Pandit Nehru opined that Pakistan wanted to make canal water a complicated case by proposing to take the matter to ICJ, therefore, if at all a choice has to be made, I would rather have arbitration than the International Court of Justice. In regard to the former, at least we shall have our own man on the bench who might influence the arbitrator by his learning and grasp of matters, as was the case recently in regard to the Bagge Tribunal; once we submit the case to the International Court of Justice, we just become helpless37. 

37 Letters of Patel to Nehru 

38 India-Pakistan Relations 1947-2007 MEF India.pdf 

The outcome of Inter-Dominion Conference is summarized herewith that: 

a. India agreed to: 

● Restore canal water supplies to West Punjab (Pakistan) for a “certain period”.( extent of period not specified) 

● Progressively reduce supply of water to West Punjab, allowing Pakistan to explore alternative water sources to replace the supply. 

The amount of canal water to be released from UBDC, calculated during the IDC-Delhi, from East Punjab, India to West Punjab, Pakistan was as followings38: Canal	RD Point	CUSEC
1	Lahore Branch	RD.197630	623.0
2	Main Branch Lower	RD.250563	1382.0
3	Pull Disty.	RD.74595	24.0
4	Rai Minor of Pull Disty.	RD.22916	16.0
5	Kohali Disty.	RD.67245	52.0
6	Khalra Disty.	RD.26900	17.0
7	Buchar Khana Dist	RD.15705	363.0
Total	2477